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How do government-supplied institutional benefits and the taxation and regulation of producers affect the propensity of
private firms to enter the unofficial economy and evade taxation? We propose a model in which the incentive of firms to
operate underground depends on tax rates relative to firm-specific thresholds of tax toleration that are decisively affected
by quality of governance—in particular by the presence of high-grade institutions delivering services enhancing official
production that anchor profit-maximizing firms to the official economy. Some key predictions of the model concerning the
determinants of firms’ tax toleration and tax compliance receive broad support from empirical analyses of enterprise-level
data from the World Bank’s World Business Environment Surveys.
U
nofficial production of goods and services is
a big deal—an activity engaged in by millions
of firms employing hundreds of millions of
workers and producing trillions of dollars of output
internationally.1 The lion’s share of research on the de-
terminants of the scale of the unofficial economy investi-
gates cross-national patterns among aggregate economic
andinstitutionalvariables.Themicropolitical-economic
mechanisms by which institutions, policies, and related
factors influence the productive behavior of firms are
muchlesswelldocumentedandunderstood,thoughem-
pirical studies based on national aggregates sometimes
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1Unofficialeconomicactivityisdefinedhereasproductionandsaleofgoodsandservicesthatevadeofficialregistrationandtaxation.Such
activity is undertaken either by firms that are not registered officially, or by firms that are registered officially but produce and sell at least
part of their output unofficially. Common labels used in place of “unofficial” are hidden, parallel, underground, shadow, informal, black,
and unobserved. Schneider and Enste (2002) provide detailed discussion of various definitions of the concept and estimates of aggregate
national magnitudes.
2Loayza (1996), Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997), Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton (1998), and Friedman et al. (2000) are
important examples of research investigating model-derived relationships among government policies, institutions, and the underground
economy with empirical data for country aggregates. Johnson et al. (2000) investigate similar empirical relationships in firm-level data for
five East European transition countries without reference to an explicit model.
draw inferences about the micro processes that might
underlie the macro political-economic relationships un-
covered.2
This article focuses explicitly on the productive ac-
tivity of private firms, which compared to individuals
are relatively unaffected by moral sentiments—by the
guilt and shame individuals may feel when evading taxa-
tion and failing to comply with other legal obligations.
We propose a microlevel model specifying how insti-
tutional benefits, taxation, and government regulations
rationally influence a profit-maximizing firm’s produc-
tion choices. Unlike models that have firms making “all
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or nothing” choices about producing officially or unof-
ficially,3 a central prediction of the model is that profit-
maximizing firms frequently will operate simultaneously
in both production modes. Moreover, contrary to a tra-
ditional view that high tax rates are intrinsically a major
cause of large shadow economies, the model implies that
theincentiveoffirmstoproduceundergroundandevade
taxation depends on statutory tax rates relative to firm-
specific, rationally calibrated thresholds of tax toleration.
The concept of firm-specific tax toleration helps explain
why tax compliance and unofficial production vary so
greatly across enterprises operating in the same national
political-institutional environment and facing the same
government regulations and tax rates.
Therestofthearticleisorganizedasfollows.Thepro-
ductionsettingofprofit-maximizingfirmsthatoptimally
allocatelaborandcapitaltoofficialproduction,unofficial
production, or both is defined in the next section. Offi-
cial production is subject to taxes and regulations, but
it benefits from government supplied and coordinated
institutional services unavailable to underground opera-
tions. Unofficial production, on the other hand, escapes
regulations and taxation of profits and labor, but it re-
quires firms to bribe enforcement authorities who aim
to maximize their own income from public employment
and bribes, subject to the likelihood of being discovered
selling corruption and suffering the penalties associated
therewith.Inthissettingthecircumstancesunderwhicha
firmwillundertakeatleastsomeofitsproductionunder-
ground and evade taxes are derived. A central condition
underlying unofficial production and tax evasion is that
statutory tax rates exceed firm-specific thresholds of tax
toleration. Toleration thresholds are determined, among
otherthings,bygovernment-suppliedinstitutionalbene-
fits available only to official production and by political-
institutional variables affecting the costs of corruption
required to produce unofficially. At the end of this sec-
tion some implications of the model for the responses of
a firm’s official, unofficial, and total output to changes in
tax rates and changes in tax toleration induced by shifts
in outside policy variables affecting the demand for and
supply of corruption are illustrated graphically.
The model’s predications concerning the determi-
nants of firms’ tax toleration and tax compliance are
tested empirically in the third section by ordered logit re-
gression analyses based on interview data obtained from
managers of 3,686 enterprises distributed over 55 coun-
tries by the World Bank’s World Business Environment
3InJohnson,Kaufmann,andShleifer(1997),forexample,thequal-
ity of institutions and governance drive firms into an activity equi-
librium allowing only one of two stable states: totally official and
totally unofficial.
Surveys (WBES 2000; see note 28). Both structural and
reduced form regression equations yield broad support
of the model’s testable implications. Observations about
the policy implications of the theory and evidence are
developed in the final section.
TheSetting
Consider private firms endowed with fixed stocks of cap-
ital ¯ K and variable labor requirements in two nonexclu-
sive modes of potential production: official production
yielding declared output yo that is subject to taxation,
and unofficial production yielding undeclared output yu
thatevadestaxation. Lo denoteslaboremployedofficially
and Lu denotes labor employed unofficially. Assume that
wage rates w are the same for all workers but that an
employer’s labor cost in official activity is (1 + tw) · w,
where the labor tax rate tw subsumes the formal payroll
tax rate tL and regulations on officially employed labor
RL that impose costs that are functionally equivalent to
conventional labor taxes.4 k denotes the fraction of its
capital that the firm allocates to official production and
(1 − k)isthefractionallocatedtounofficialproduction.5
A firm’s total output ytotal is the sum of its official output
yo and its unofficial output yu. ytotal may be comprised
ofseparateproductionchainsoperatingindependentlyat
different locales in official yo and/or unofficial yu mode,
or by parallel operation of the two modes at one venue.
yo production is represented by the following Cobb-
Douglas type (constant returns to scale) technology:
yo = B(k ¯ K)L
o,  +  +  = 1, ,, > 0.
(1)
B denotes the productive value of institutional services
available only to official activity,6 such as contract en-
forcement and protection of property by police and ju-
dicial authorities, customs and export subsidies and ser-
vices, and official banking services.7 It excludes public
4W ecouldallowthewageratewtovarybetweenafirm’sofficialand
unofficial operations, wo and wu, but so doing would not change
the model’s implications so long as wage costs (as opposed to wage
rates) remained higher in official production—a condition which
is achieved in the present setup by the payroll tax factor (1 + tw).
5Hence the model abstracts from capital accumulation and each
firm’s allocation of its capital endowment ¯ K reveals its disposition
to engage in official and unofficial production.
6For simplicity we assume there are no “user costs” attached to B;
providing for them would add little to the formal analysis.
7Itiseasytothinkofconcreteexamplesofinstitutionalservicestied
to official production and its inputs (the official part of total pro-
duction),evenamongfirmssimultaneouslyengagedinofficialand
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goods like a nation’s communication and transport in-
frastructures and public health and education systems
that benefit both official and unofficial producers and
their employees as well as other aspects of institutional
capacity that do not directly affect productive efficiency.
The productive contribution of B will generally depend
both on firm-specific attributes—for example, size, area
of activity, complexity of legal organization, managerial
sophistication8—and on the country-specific availabil-
ity of institutional services of given quality. Hence even
among firms with high need of institutional services ow-
ingtotheircharacteristics,inputsofBmaybelowbecause
of generic deficiencies of national capacity.
Production of unofficial, untaxed output yu can take
no benefit of government institutional services. In prin-
ciple, yu and yo denote goods and services of the same
kindandquality.However,inordertoemploycapitaland
labor underground and avoid confiscation of unofficial
outputbyomniscientbureaucrats,firmspursuingunoffi-
cial operations must engage in corrupt transactions with
enforcement officials—tax authorities, health and safety
inspection agents, construction site inspectors, and so
tandem at one venue to produce a homogeneous stock of goods or
services ytotal,whichconsequentlyispartlyofficialandgovernedby
yo technologyandpartlyunofficialandgovernedby yu technology.
Here are a few: Smaller-scale construction companies are known
to undertake some jobs unofficially and others officially, perhaps
unbeknownsttotheircustomers.Paymentdisputesintheindustry
arecommonplace,yetbuilderscannotseekjudicialreliefformoney
owedforunofficialjobsandcannotappealtopoliceorcourtswhen
materials are stolen from black construction sites or are stolen by
workers employed black in otherwise white projects—both being
common problems in the industry. Manufacturers producing for
export cannot take advantage of government export subsidies and
paymentinsuranceschemesifthevolumesinvolvedaresuspiciously
large relative to officially declared, taxed labor inputs and output.
Restaurants and independent hotels are known to employ some
staff officially and others unofficially (cleaning and maintenance
personnel, for example) with an eye to hiding from taxation corre-
sponding shares of revenues. Use of standard banking services for
wage payments or recourse to law enforcement agencies in cases of
alleged theft and other forms of employee malfeasance are prob-
lematic for workers engaged unofficially. The same problems face
enterprises supplying home services—gardening, cleaning, pool
maintenance, and the like.
8The assumption that firms differ with respect to their need for
and effective use of institutional services is consistent with some
existing firm-level empirical evidence. For example, in their anal-
ysis of enterprises in transition economies, Johnson, McMillan,
and Woodruff (2002) found that court enforcement of contracts
is more important to firms establishing new business relationships
than to established firms and is more important to industries with
a relatively low specificity of investments. Data presented in Batra,
Kaufmann, and Stone (2003) indicate that small firms by compar-
ison to medium and large firms are less constrained by customs
procedures,whereassmall-andmedium-sizedfirmsaremorecon-
strained than large ones by access to official banking institutions.
forth.9 Inputs of bureaucratic corruption are therefore
necessary for a firm to produce and market unofficial
output. The quantity of those inputs is denoted by units
of “C.” Unofficial production technology has the same
parameters and functional form as official technology:
yu = C((1 − k) ¯ K)L
u.( 2 )
By contrast to some previous studies that view cor-
ruption and bribery as forces driving firms out of official
production into the underground economy,10 equation
(2) is based on the idea that the “grabbing hands” of
corrupt bureaucrats serve as “helping hands” allowing
firms to exploit profitable opportunities by producing
unofficially.
Aprofit-maximizingfirmneedstodecidehowmuch
labor to employ officially and unofficially,11 how to dis-
tribute its capital stock between the two production
modes, and how much corruption to buy from cor-
ruptible bureaucrats.12 Firms are price takers and output
prices are normalized to 1 so that revenue is cotermi-
nous with output. The firm maximizes net revenue  by
solving the problem
max
k,Lo,Lu,C

= (1 − t)[yo − (1 + tw)wLo] + [yu − wLu − mC]
s.t. 0 ≤ k ≤ 1;C, Lo, Lu ≥ 0; andeqs.(1) − (2)
(3)
9Theproductiveactivitywemodelisnotcriminalinthesensethatit
wouldbelegalifundertakenintheofficial,taxedeconomy.Inother
words, we are not dealing with activities generally treated as crimi-
nally illegal (and frequently controlled by criminal organizations),
such as the drug trade, smuggling, and prostitution.
10See, for example, Choi and Thum (2005), Johnson, Kaufmann,
and Shleifer (1997), and Friedman et al. (2000).
11F i r m sa r ea s s u m e dt ob ea b l et oa l l o c a t el a b o rf r e e l yb e t w e e n
official and unofficial activity. Treating labor as a passive resource
is of course an abstraction from the real world in which workers
as well as firms face incentives and disincentives to participate
in the underground economy. The seminal economic analysis of
taxcomplianceamongutility-maximizingindividualsisAlingham
and Sandmo (1972). Sandmo (2005) reviews developments in this
tradition over the generation following the original 1972 article.
12Firms producing officially may also pay bribes to obtain or to
speed up delivery of B from recalcitrant government authorities.
(SeeShleiferandVishny1993.)Andbothofficialandunofficialpro-
ducers may engage mafia-type organizations to obtain criminally
(and, indeed, sometimes more effectively) such official services
as contract enforcement. No attempt to model such complica-
tions and attention is confined to the bureaucratic corruption and
bribery necessary for a firm to produce in the underground econ-
omy. Incorporating bribery to official activity would lead to results
dependent upon relative corruption in the two sectors, without
qualitatively affecting our conclusions. The pathbreaking study of
Peru by De Soto (1989) found that bribe payments by unofficial
businesses vastly exceeded those made by official businesses.TAX TOLERATION AND TAX COMPLIANCE 21
where m denotes the unit price of C,a n dt h et a xr a t e
t subsumes the formal profit tax rate tF and regulatory
burdensonofficialactivityRF thatareanalogoustotaxes.
The Bureaucrat’s Problem
In any given jurisdiction corruption is supplied mo-
nopolistically by a representative public official (a “bu-
reaucrat”) who is responsible for enforcing the tax code
and other regulations. The enforcement bureaucrat is as-
sumedabletoaccuratelydetectafirm’sunofficialactivity
but is willing to overlook it if compensated sufficiently
by illegal payments.13 The bureaucrat receives a salary
equal to S. If involved in corrupt transactions and not
caught, the bureaucrat enjoys additional income from
bribes equal to m · C. If discovered to be selling corrup-
tion, the bureaucrat loses employment and pays a fixed
penalty P. The bureaucrat’s expected income E(yb)t h e n
is
E (yb) =  (S + mC) − (1 − ) P (4)
where (1 − ) is the probability that the bureaucrat is
discovered to be selling C.
The probability  is determined by an exogenous
(unmodeled) mechanism exposing corruption
 = e−C,  > 0. (5)
At any given C,  determines the effectiveness of expo-
sureprocedures,whichwilltendtovarywithfirm-specific
characteristics affecting the visibility of transactions in
the corruption market.14 Note that ∂
∂C =− e−C < 0,
so that the more units of corruption sold by the bureau-
crat, the higher the chances (1 − ) of being caught and
penalized. However, if the exposure mechanism is weak
( is small), the probability of being caught tends to be
small, even when C is large.15
Thebureaucrat’sproblemistosetapricemperunitof
corruption that maximizes expected income (4), subject
13The setup below draws on the pioneering article of Becker
and Stigler (1974) and the subsequent more complex model of
Mookherjee and Png (1995), which is oriented to firms that pay
bribesinordertoevadepollutionregulations.Modelscomposedof
the interplay of three constituents—an outside exposure or mon-
itoring mechanism, and buyers and sellers of corruption—owe
much to Klitgaard (1988). The seminal work launching modern
political-economic analysis of corruption more generally is Rose-
Ackerman (1978).
14The most important characteristics affecting visibility and hence
themagnitudeofarelikelytobeaspectsoffirmsize—forexample,
the magnitudes of the firm’s capital stock ¯ K and its labor force L.
15If the exposure likelihood of corrupt transactions were affected,
say negatively, by their aggregate nationwide incidence (“ ¯ C”), then
multiple equilibria may arise of the sort studied by Andvig and
Moene (1990) and Nabin and Bose (2008). We make no attempt to
analyze such complexities here.
to(5)andthefirm’sdemandforcorruption.Theoptimal
solution to the bureaucrat’s problem yields the supply
relation16
m =
(S + P)
1 − C
.( 6 )
Equation (6) implies that enforcement bureaucrats will
supply corruption and overlook tax evasion only if firms
willpayaunitpricemhigherthanaminimumdefinedby
m
¯
= (S + P). The minimum acceptable price m
¯
rises
as the bureaucrat’s salary S increases, as the mechanism
for exposing corruption becomes more effective (as 
increases), and as punishment becomes more stringent
(as P increases). In other words, the higher are , S,a n d
P, the more costly it is to induce bureaucrats to supply
corruption.Andthegreateristhedemandforcorruption,
the higher is the unit price of C acceptable to bureaucrats
at given risks of exposure and punishment. Equation (6)
also implies that a finite positive equilibrium price for
corruption can exist only when C < 1
, reinforcing the
point that the less effective are procedures for detecting
corruption, the less constrained is its supply from the
bureaucracyandthehigheristhelikelihoodthatamarket
for corruption will exist.17
Along with institutional services B directly affecting
productivity of official activity, national realizations of
, S,a n dP comprise important aspects of a country’s
broaderinstitutionalcapacity.Ifthatbroadernationalca-
pacity were introduced explicitly and indexed by ¯ B, then
B, , S,andP wouldbeconstituentcomponents.B and
{, S, P} are treated as structurally distinct even though
they generally will be correlated positively by virtue of an
underlying common national determinant ¯ B left outside
the model’s formal setup to economize on notation.18
16ProofsofallresultsassertedinthisarticlearegiveninanAppendix
of Proofs available at www.douglas-hibbs.com.
17Complicit firms are not punished in the same fashion as enforce-
ment authorities discovered sellingcorruption because profitfrom
unofficial production in (3) is not affected directly by the exposure
probability (1 − ). Instead exposure effectiveness depresses profit
via the positive effect of  on the price of corruption m. Modify-
ing the structure of penalties and costs falling on bureaucrats and
firms yields analytical results qualitatively similar to those derived
forthepresentmodel,thoughsomeplausiblevariationscomplicate
enormously the comparative statics.
18Illustrated graphically:
wheresingle-headedarrowsindicatestructural-causalrelationsand
double-headedarrowsrepresentnoncausalcorrelations.Hencethe
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Indeed there is some gain in so doing because focusing
on components of ¯ B like B and {, S, P} allows theo-
retical analysis later in this section of specific proximate
demand- and supply-side determinants of unofficial ac-
tivity and tax evasion, and at the same time it does not
detract from the empirical analyses reported in the third
section.
Unofficial Production and the Existence
of Corruption Markets
Assume that the firm has perfect information about the
bureaucrat’s supply schedule in (6). For given positive
values B, t, tw, , S,a n dP, the firm’s maximization
program in (3) admits two solutions: (1) an interior so-
lution where the firm allocates capital and labor to both
official and unofficial production, and (2) a corner so-
lution where labor and capital are allocated wholly to
official production. In the first case the firm enters into
corrupt transactions with bureaucrats in order to protect
its unofficial output, whereas in the second the firm has
no incentive to evade taxes and produce unofficially, and
thushasnoneedofC.19 Thetwocasesarenowconsidered
sequentially.
When the firm finds it optimal to produce in both
modes simultaneously (k < 1), the profit-maximizing
levels of output are
yo =

Bm


(1 − t)



1
1 + tw
 

(7)
yu =


m
 
 

w
 

(1 − k) ¯ K (8)
where the share of capital allocated to official produc-
tionisk =
(1−t)
+
 B( 1
1+tw )


( 
m)
+
 ¯ K(

w)

 .Intuitively,equations(7)–(8)
can be interpreted as saying that the firm decides how
causal effect on official production yo via B and negative causal
effect on unofficial production yu via{, S, P} s positive effect on
corruption prices m, as shown ahead in the main text by equations
(7) and (8).
19The third hypothetical possibility in which the firm operates
wholly in the unofficial sector emerges only in the fanciful case
of confiscatory taxation (t = 1) or, more realistically, when offi-
cial institutional services are either not needed by the firm or are
not provided to any meaningful extent by government (B = 0).
Small operations delivering personal services (often single-person
“firms”)probablyarethemostcommonexampleofcasesinwhich
theproductivevalueofB ispracticallyzero.TheWBES(2000)data
used for empirical testing in the third section were obtained from
firms legally registered and, therefore, not engaged exclusively in
unofficial production.
much output to produce in each mode by first determin-
ing the maximum output it could produce unofficially
where it avoids taxes on profits and labor. Setting k = 0
ontherightsideof(8)givesnotionalmaximumunofficial
output as ymax
u = ( 
m)

(

w)

 ¯ K. The firm then implicitly
trades off part of ymax
u for taxable output yo up to the
point where institutional benefits to official production
compensate the firm for the tax liabilities incurred by
producing officially. It follows that the firm will find it
profitable to operate to some degree unofficially (k < 1
and yu > 0) only if


m
 +
 

w
 

¯ K > (1 − t)
+


1
1 + tw
 

B.( 9 )
For a given capital stock ¯ K, condition (9) indicates that
the firm engages in tax evasion when cheap corruption
and relatively low wage costs affecting unofficial activity
combine with high tax rates on profits and labor and
deficient institutional services affecting official activity.
Recall from the analysis of the bureaucrat’s problem
that a positive supply of corruption requires m to be
above the minimum price m
¯
= (S + P). The firm, on
the other hand, needs to pay bribes to purchase C only
if it produces unofficially (yu > 0), which by (9) requires
that
m < 
 ¯ K
B
 
+ 

w
 
(+)
(1 − t)
− 
 (1 + tw)

(+). (10)
The right side of (10) therefore defines the upper bound
ofC’sunitprice,whichwillbedenoted ¯ m.Corrupttrans-
actions between firms and bureaucrats will exist only if
m
¯
< ¯ m, that is, only if
(S + P)
< 
 ¯ K
B
 
+ 

w
 
(+)
(1 − t)
− 
 (1 + tw)

(+).
(11)
When(11)holds,firmsandenforcementbureaucratswill
agree on a unique price for units of C and an active
corruption market enabling unofficial production will
exist.
The firm’s demand for corruption, implied by the
first-order condition for C in (3), is
C =


m
 +
 

w
 

(1 − k) ¯ K (12)
where recall that k is a positive function of B, m,a n dw
and a negative function of t, tw,a n d ¯ K (see equation 8).
Figure 1 uses sensible values for terms in the corruption
supply and demand functions (equations 6 and 12) toTAX TOLERATION AND TAX COMPLIANCE 23
FIGURE1 PricesandQuantitiesinthe
Corruption Market
When a firm is willing to pay a price per unit of C exceeding
the minimum price m
¯
acceptable to enforcement bureaucrats, an
active market for corruption will exist with equilibrium (m∗,C∗).
show that a unique equilibrium (m∗,C∗)e x i s t si nt h e
admissible range (m
¯
, ¯ m).20
Tax Toleration and Tax Compliance
In addition to defining conditions for the existence of a
corruptionmarket,equation(11)hasimportantimplica-
tions for the impact of profit taxation on tax compliance
and the unofficial economic activity. Solving (11) for the
profit tax rate on the left side shows that unofficial pro-
duction emerges when
t > t
¯
t
¯
≡ 1−


(S + P)
 
 ¯ K
B
 
+

w
 
(+)
(1 + tw)

+ .
(13)
20A more formal demonstration runs as follows. The optimal rela-
tion (6) implies the supply function C S(m) =
m−(S+P)
m . Equa-
tion (12) gives demand as C D(m) = (

m)
+
 (

w)

(1 − k) ¯ K.A s
illustrated in Figure 1, at C S(m
¯
) = 0, C S(m
¯
) < C D(m
¯
), and at
C D( ¯ m) = 0, C D( ¯ m) < C S( ¯ m). Since C S(m) is monotonically in-
creasing in m and C D(m) is monotonically decreasing in m,i t
follows that there exists a unique value m∗ in the interval (m
¯
, ¯ m)
such that C S(m∗) = C D(m∗). Therefore, when the maximum unit
price a firm is willing to pay for C is higher than the minimum
unit price the bureaucrat is willing to accept, they will always find
ap r i c em∗ they can agree upon. When condition (11) does not
hold, m
¯
> ¯ m and the firm will not purchase corruption required
to produce unofficially and evade taxes. Consequently, there will
be no transactions for C and an active corruption market will
not exist. The conventional price-quantity axes in Figure 1 are in-
terchanged because the forgoing argument is somewhat easier to
interpret from the graph lines when C is on the vertical axis and m
is on the horizontal.
t
¯
may be interpreted as the firm’s threshold of tax tolera-
tion. What matters for a firm’s optimal production strat-
egy is not the absolute rate of profit taxation, but instead
the magnitude of t r e l a t i v et ot h er a t eaf i r mp e r c e i v e st o
be “worth paying” in light of institutional benefits avail-
able only to official activity and the cost of corruption
required to produce unofficially. In terms of variables
amenable to policy influence, (13) says that tax tolera-
tion increases with firm-specific institutional benefits B
and corruption prices m
¯
, where the latter are determined
by firm-specific effectiveness of corruption exposure 
and nation-specific bureaucratic salaries plus penalties
S + P. On the other hand, toleration of taxation falls as
the relative price of labor deployed in official production
(1 + tw) rises.
When the profit tax rate facing a firm is below its
toleration threshold, the value of tax evasion in the un-
derground economy is outweighed by a combination of
the cost of corruption necessary to produce unofficially
andprofitableopportunitiesintaxableactivitywherepro-
duction benefits from government-supplied institutional
services. Consequentlywhen t ≤ t
¯
, unofficial production
andcorruptionarenil,andfirmscomplyfullywiththetax
code. Formally, this case represents a corner solution to
thefirm’sproblemin(3)withk = 1, yu = 0,andC = 0.
Total output (ytotal)a tt h ec o r n e ri s
yo = B

+ ¯ K

+


(1 + tw)w
 
+
= ytotal. (14)
An implication of the equilibrium results is that it is
possibleforgovernmenttoimposehighratesofprofittax
without triggering large diversions of resources to under-
groundproductionandlarge-scaletaxevasionif political
authorities are able to raise B, , S,a n dP enough to
create even higher thresholds of tax toleration for most
firms. This connection of tax compliance and tax toler-
ation among firms in the model is comparable to the
concept of “fiscal exchange” between citizens and gov-
ernment developed in studies of tax compliance among
individuals. High tax compliance and positive percep-
tions of fiscal exchange arise when taxpayers regard the
tax system as fair and responsive to citizen preferences,
financinggovernmentprogramsdeliveringpersonalben-
efits and public goods citizens approve of. (See, for ex-
ample, Alm, Jackson, and McKee 1993; Cummings et al.
2005; Feld and Frey 2007; Pommerehne, Hart, and Frey
1994;PommerehneandWeck-Hannemann1996;Roberts
and Hite 1994; and Schloz and Lubell 1998.) Yet the cor-
respondence is far from perfect. As mentioned earlier,
firms inherently are less susceptible than individuals to
behavioral pressure from moral sentiments. The anguish24 DOUGLAS A. HIBBS AND VIOLETA PICULESCU
FIGURE2 OptimalOutputLevelsas theProfit
TaxRate Varies
t
— 1
t
y
ytotal
yo
yu
Official output yo decreases and unofficial output yu increases
monotonically as the tax rate t r i s e sa b o v eaf i r m ’ st a xt o l e r a t i o n
threshold t
¯
. Consequently the official output share yo/(yo + yu)
decreases,butthefirm’stotaloutput ytotal = (yo + yu)mayexpand
or contract, depending on the initial condition of t. At t < t
¯
all
production is official, and at t = 1 all production is unofficial.
of bad conscience may weigh upon individuals; rational
calculations of the bottom line drive the firm.
Figure2 depictsthepatternofarepresentativefirm’s
production choices as the profit tax rate t varies around
a fixed threshold of tax toleration t
¯
. The constituents of t
(the profit tax rate proper tF, and regulations on official
producers RF) are of course core policy instruments in
any national political economy. Total output in Figure 2
cumulates the firm’s official and unofficial production.
In the graph region where t < t
¯
(to the left of t
¯
on
the horizontal axis) all of a firm’s production is official;
ytotal = yo.Ast risesabovethethresholdt
¯
,firmsbeginto
findunofficialactivityprofitableandtheyproduce yo and
yu simultaneously. The response of production decisions
to increases of the profit tax rate among firms perceiving
t > t
¯
and, consequently, already evading taxes to some
degree, is composed of direct and indirect effects. Tax
rate hikes directly depress marginal returns on labor and
capital in official production, which by itself prompts
firms to shift resources to unofficial activity—k falls and
yu rises (equation 8). Higher underground production,
however, requires bigger inputs of corruption, and the
associated upward shift in demand for C prompts an
upward adjustment of the price m (equation 6) in the
corruption market, which mutes the increase in unoffi-
cial activity ultimately induced by a higher t (equations
7–8).21 Nonetheless, in the range t > t
¯
,h i g h e rt a xr a t e s
21In other words, the impact of tax rate changes on a firm’s output
decisionswouldbestronger,andtheequilibriumlevelofcorruption
unambiguously lead to equilibrium increases of yu and
decreases of yo and, therefore, to decreases in the share of
official output in a firm’s total production.22
The effect of changes to profit tax rates on a firm’s
total output, ytotal = yo + yu, depends on t’s initial con-
dition. As suggested by Figure 2, in the range t >> t
¯
an
increaseint inducesadeclineinofficialoutputthatmore
than offsets the corresponding rise of unofficial output,
thereby contracting the firm’s aggregate production.23
Thereasonisthatwhenprofittaxratesarerelativelyhigh,
firms tend to be heavily engaged in unofficial production
and to be paying high prices for the big quantities of cor-
ruptionrequiredtosustainthelargescaleofunderground
operations. As a result, increases to already high tax rates
yield only modest expansions of the firm’s unofficial ac-
tivity,andthesearemorethanoffsetbycontractionsofits
official output. Hence the firm’s total output declines. At
lower initial tax rates, however, the firm’s aggregate out-
put may well increase due to increases of profit taxation
because the tax-induced expansion of its unofficial pro-
duction exceeds the associated tax-induced contraction
of its official production.24 The implications for interna-
tional patterns in macroeconomic performance depend
on the distribution across countries of national rates of
profit tax t in relation to firm-specific levels of tax toler-
ation t
¯
. And the implications for government objectives
in various countries—for example, maximization of ag-
gregate official output or perhaps even aggregate income
altogether, official plus unofficial—depend on national
distributions of firm-specific tax toleration in relation to
the common tax rate facing all firms in a country.25
would be higher, in the absence of interactions in the corruption
market between firms and bureaucrats over the price of C that
promptbureaucratstoadjustminresponsetoshiftsinthedemand
for corruption.
22Formally, for any t > t
¯
it can be shown that
∂ lnm
∂ lnt > 0,
∂ lnC
∂ lnt >
0,
∂ ln yo
∂ lnt < 0,
∂ ln yu
∂ lnt > 0,and
∂ ln( yo
yo+yu )
∂ lnt < 0.Moredetailedanalysis
of the comparative statics appears in the Appendix of Proofs.
23Specifically,
∂ ln(yo+yu)
∂ lnt < 0i ft >

+(1 − C).
24Note that results here and ahead assume firms do not internal-
ize potential feedback from increased official production to higher
government tax revenues, which in turn might finance lower tax
rates or improved government services benefiting official produc-
tion. The impact of an individual firm’s production choices on
government resources is negligible and so potential feedback ef-
fects rationally would be disregarded in optimal decision making.
25This and related themes are pursued at greater length in the con-
cluding section. Descriptive statistics reported in the third section
indicate that within-country dispersion of tax toleration and its
determinants are large.TAX TOLERATION AND TAX COMPLIANCE 25
FIGURE3 OutputEffectsofanImprovementto
InstitutionalBenefits B
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An increase in B raises a firm’s threshold of tax toleration from
t
¯
0 to t
¯
1. Optimal production decisions under t
¯
1 are shown by the
blackgraphlinesandunder t
¯
0 b ythegr eygrap hlines.A tan ygi v e n
tax rate t, the rise in t
¯
prompts the firm to produce more official
output yo, and less unofficial output yu. The increase of yo always
exceeds the decrease of yu, and so total output ytotal rises along
with the official output share yo/(yo + yu).
FIGURE4 Ou tpu tE ffectso fanI ncr easein
Corruption ExposureEffectiveness

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An increase in  raises a firm’s threshold of tax toleration from
t
¯
0 to t
¯
1. Optimal production decisions under t
¯
1 are shown by the
blackgraphlinesandundert
¯
0 bythegreygraphlines.Theincrease
of tax toleration induced by higher  prompts less unofficial and
more official production among firms with t > t
¯
.H o w e v e r ,t h e
decline of yu is bigger than the rise of yo, and so although the
official output share yo/(yo + yu) rises, total output ytotal falls.
Production choices of firms with t < t
¯
are not affected by changes
in .
Demand-and Supply-Side Determinants
of Tax Toleration and Compliance
Now consider how movements in tax toleration affect a
firm’s optimal production decisions. Figures 3 and 4
illustrate the effects of changes in tax toleration originat-
ing with an increase to institutional services B and with
an increase to the effectiveness of corruption exposure ,
respectively.RecallthatBisaprincipaldeterminantofthe
demandforcorruption,whereasisakeyvariableaffect-
ing the supply side of the corruption market. Along with
thedemand-sidevariabletw andthesupply-sidevariables
S and P, the availability and quality of institutional ser-
vices and the effectiveness of corruption detection are
potential policy instruments that could be used by na-
tionalauthoritiestoinfluencetaxtoleration,andthrough
that route tax compliance and underground production.
Figure 3 graphs how firms’ profitable production
possibilities shift owing to an increase in B raising tax
toleration from t
¯
0 to t
¯
1, with other outside variables held
constant. The enhancement of B i n d u c e sa l lf i r m st oi n -
crease official output (equations 7 and 14). Moreover,
firmsinitiallyoperatingtosomedegreeunofficiallywhose
tax toleration threshold is pushed above the profit tax
rate by improvement to institutional services (firms with
t
¯
0 < t < t
¯
1)willceaseproducingunderground.Firmsal-
readyactiveundergroundwhosenewtolerationthreshold
remains below the profit tax rate (firms with t
¯
0 < t
¯
1 < t)
will continue operating unofficially, but will reallocate
some resources out of unofficial production to official
production. Hence both official output yo and the share
of official output in total output
yo
yo+yu increase with im-
provements to B. And although transaction prices for
corruption m will adjust downward in response to the
across-the-board decline in demand for corruption, in
equilibrium both the level and the price of corruption
will be lower in the wake of the expansion among all
firms of both official and total production.26
Figure4illustratestheoutputeffectsofanincreasein
the effectiveness of the corruption exposure mechanism
 that raises the firm’s threshold of tax toleration from t
¯
0
tot
¯
1,withotheroutsidevariablesagainheldconstant.An
increase in  contracts the supply of corruption, which
induces higher official production and lower unofficial
production among all firms with initial condition t > t
¯
.
By contrast to B,h o w e v e r , is not a factor of produc-
tion and it therefore exerts no influence on the output
decisions of firms with initial condition t < t
¯
,t h a ti s ,
among firms initially active wholly in the official econ-
omy. In this sense the carrot of improved institutions
has wider impact than the stick of improved detection of
corruption because the former affects the behavior of all
firms.
26Formally, it can be shown that
∂ lnC
∂ ln B < 0,
∂ lnm
∂ ln B < 0,
∂ ln yu
∂ ln B <
0,
∂ ln yo
∂ ln B > 0,
∂ ln(yo+yu)
∂ ln B > 0 and,
∂ ln( yo
yo+yu )
∂ ln B > 0. Changes to tw
yield the same pattern of effects but with opposite signs.26 DOUGLAS A. HIBBS AND VIOLETA PICULESCU
Moreover, unlike the case of improvements to insti-
tutionalbenefits,whichalwaysraisetotalaswellasofficial
production, improved detection of corruption does not
yield higher total output because the ensuing decline of
the firm’s unofficial output exceeds the growth of its offi-
cial output. Intuitively, the explanation of this result may
be described by the following sequence of events. The
heightened probability of being caught and punished for
sellingcorruptionbroughtaboutbyanincreasetoleads
income-maximizing enforcement bureaucrats to require
higherunitpricesmtosupplygivenquantitiesofcorrup-
tion. More expensive corruption reduces firms’ demand
for inputs of C necessary to produce unofficially with-
out affecting the marginal products of inputs to official
production.Withlowerunofficialproductionandhigher
exposureprobability,thequantityofcorruptiondecreases
anditspriceincreases.Inthenewenvironmentfirmswill
tendtotransfersomeoftheirresourcestoofficialproduc-
tion, but only to the extent that additional official prof-
its compensate for the unofficial profits forgone due to
highercostsofcorruption.Firmsthatinthefirstinstance
were evading taxes will sometimes even find it profitable
toexittheundergroundeconomycompletely(firmswith
t
¯
0 < t < t
¯
1). Yet like firms that remain to some degree
in the underground economy under t
¯
1, the expansion
of official production among exiting firms will not fully
compensate for loss of unofficial output. Consequently,
amongfirmsinitiallylocatedintheranget > t
¯
,increases
to  yield rises in the official share of output but declines
in aggregate output.27
SomeEmpiricalEvidence
From late 1999 to mid-2000 the World Bank sponsored
interviewswithmanagersofmorethan10,000enterprises
in 80 countries covering the main regions of the world—
27More precisely, as shown in the Appendix of Proofs, even though
an increase in  has a positive effect on a tax-evading firm’s of-
ficial production,
∂ ln yo
∂ ln > 0, and on its official share of total pro-
duction,
∂ ln( yo
yo+yu )
∂ ln > 0, the effect on its total output is negative,
∂ ln(yo+yu)
∂ ln < 0. The effects of changes in S and P are qualitatively
the same.
Asnotedearlier,institutionalbenefitsB andeffectivenessofcor-
ruption exposure  will generally be imperfectly correlated pos-
itively because both reflect an underlying generic capacity of the
state. Hence the opposite responses of total output to shifts in B
and  depicted in Figures 3 and 4, respectively, will to some de-
gree be offsetting if both variables move at once; nonetheless it is
illuminating to understand the partial-conditional effects of those
distinct channels of influence.
theWorldBusinessEnvironmentSurveys(WBES2000).28
Theinterviewsdealt,amongotherthings,withmanagers’
perceptions of the operational difficulties posed by taxa-
tion, government regulations, corruption of public offi-
cials, functioning of the judiciary, and access to financial
services. The surveys also obtained reports about the de-
gree of tax compliance among firms. The WBES data
make possible rough empirical tests of key implications
of the model concerning (1) some direct determinants of
firm-level toleration of taxation, and (2) direct and in-
direct determinants of the share of total output declared
officially and subjected to tax among firms.
Empiricalanalyseswereundertakenforasubsetofthe
enterprises sampled. First, because the model pertains to
the behavior of private firms, the public sector firms sur-
veyed are excluded. Second, enterprises in African coun-
tries are excluded because in that region the data were
obtained predominately from mail surveys, rather than
fromin-personinterviews which were undertakenevery-
where else. Postal survey data are far less reliable than
the personal interview data.29 Finally, the usable sample
was reduced further due to missing data for one or more
variables in the multivariate analyses. Sample attrition
from this source included all Middle Eastern countries.
All told, the regression analyses ahead are based on a
common sample of personal interview responses from
managers of 3,686 firms distributed over 55 countries.
Tax Toleration
A central message of the model is that a firm’s propensity
to produce officially and pay taxes is driven by the gap
between its tax toleration t
¯
and tax rate t.L e ti be an
index for firms and j an index for countries. Because the
profit tax rate subsumes conventional country-level rates
tF
j , and regulations on official activity which generally
impact individual firms in different ways RF
ij,p r o f i tt a x
ratesarefirm-specific:tij = t(tF
j , RF
ij).Similarly,because
thelabortaxratesubsumesconventionalnationalpayroll
rates tL
j , and labor regulations RL
ij which generally affect
28The raw WBES (2000) data and documentation are available at
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/Content/ic-wbes. The
WBES (2000) raw data, external data on labor and corporate tax
rates, as well as precise specifications of procedures generating
working variables from the raw data and of all statistical results
in this article are contained in Stata 9.2 do and dta files posted at
www.douglas-hibbs.com.
29Among other problems, the African postal surveys yielded very
low response rates and implausibly low reports of tax evasion—
hardlysurprisinginviewofthefactthatrespondentswereaskedto
commit reports of illegal behavior to writing.TAX TOLERATION AND TAX COMPLIANCE 27
firms in different ways, labor tax rates are firm-specific:
twij = tw(tL
j , RL
ij).
The expression defining t
¯
ij in (13) indicates that tax
toleration is affected negatively by payroll tax rates twij
which determine the relative wage costs in official as
compared to unofficial production and vary over firms
in every country, and is affected positively by institu-
tionalbenefits Bij whichlikewisevaryoverfirmsinevery
country. Tax toleration is also positively affected by two
variables that we could not measure: total wage costs
in unofficial production wij, and corruption price min-
imam
¯
ij = ij(Sj + Pj)whic hvaryo v erfirms(o wingt o
firm-specific visibility effects embodied in the detection
parameter ij) in various countries (owing to national
salary levels Sj and malfeasance penalties Pj). However,
someofthepositiveeffectsofwij andij(Sj + Pj)ontij
will be picked up by the size of firms’ capital stock ¯ Kij,a
variablethatiswellmeasuredbytheWBES. ¯ Kijpositively
affectstaxtolerationbyincreasingthevisibilityofcorrup-
tionanditsexposureij,whichinturnraisescorruption
priceminima m
¯
ij. ¯ Kij alsowilltendtoraisewageswij via
so-called efficiency wage policies associated with large,
capital-rich firms. Through those indirect channels ¯ Kij
willexertpositiveeffectontaxtoleration.Butthedirectef-
fectof ¯ Kijont
¯
ijin(13)isnegative.30Consequentlythenet
effectofafirm’scapitalstockontaxtolerationisambigu-
ous. The functional relations in terms of observables are
t
¯
ij = F

+
Bij, tw

−
tL
j ,
+
RL
ij

,
+/−
K ij

(15)
wheretheexpectedsignof F  (·)a p pe a r sa bo v ee a c ht e rm
on the right side of (15).
Tax toleration t
¯
ij is measured by the following WBES
question: “Please judge on a four point scale how problem-
atic are high taxes for the operation and growth of your
business” with ordered response categories 1 = ‘major
obstacle’ 2 = ‘moderate obstacle’ 3 = ‘minor obstacle’ and
4=‘noobstacle’.31 Theaimistotapanunderlyingcontin-
uumrunningfromlowtohighvaluesoffirm-specifictax
toleration. A potential deficiency, however, is that when
toleration is genuinely low (because taxation is in fact
perceived to be a major problem), firm managers may
nonetheless reply “no obstacle” because they are easily
30In a model of unofficial production and tax evasion among firms
in which capital accumulation is endogenous, Busato et al. (2008)
obtain theoretical results implying that direct fiscal subsidy of cap-
italformation(asopposedtotaxdeductionsforinvestmentspend-
ing) gives firms incentive to divert resources to unofficial activity
and tax evasion.
31To ease interpretation of regression results in the next section the
response codes in the raw WBES (2000) questionnaire data which
r a nf r o m1= No obstacle to 4 = Major obstacle were reversed in
this and other “obstacle” questions discussed ahead.
able to evade taxes by shifting operations underground,
thereby conflating the concept of tax toleration with acts
of tax evasion and weakening the observed connection
between the two. Although serious in principle, this fun-
damental source of measurement error is not likely to be
quantitatively important because the incidence of neg-
ligible toleration registered by the interviews is so low:
only 9% of responses fall in the “no obstacle”c a t e g o r y ,
whereas fully 58% of firm managers regarded taxes as a
“major obstacle” with another 22% perceiving taxes as a
“moderate obstacle.”32
Institutional services Bij are measured by the WBES
question“Pleasejudgeonafourpointscalehowproblematic
are these different regulatory areas for the operation and
growth of your business” for items pertaining to access
to financial services, functioning of the judicial system,
and customs procedures. The response options for each
item are again scaled 1 = “major obstacle” to 4 = “no
obstacle.” Ac o m p o s i t ei n d e xo fBij was constructed by
taking the arithmetic average of the scale values across
the three items, yielding 10 exclusive ordinal categories
running from 1 to 4 by increments of one-third.
A composite measure of regulations on official activ-
ity imposingburdensonofficialproducers RF
ij,whichare
analogous to conventional profit taxes, was constructed
in the same way as Bij by averaging the 4-point scale re-
sponses to “how problematic are” questions dealing with
business licensing, environmental regulations, fire and
safety regulations, and foreign exchange regulations. The
resulting composite variable for RF
ij had 13 exclusive cat-
egories running from 1 to 4 by increments of one-fourth.
Labor regulations affecting officially employed labor RL
ij,
which are akin to conventional payroll taxes, were mea-
sured by 4-point scale responses to the same question re-
garding perceptions of problems created by government
labor regulations.
Capitalassets offirms ¯ KijaremeasuredbytheWBES
questionaskingmanagersto“estimate[thevalueof]your
firm’s fixed assets—land, buildings, equipment.” Com-
mon responses in the country surveys fall into 10 cate-
goriesrangingfromlessthan250,000USDto500,000,000
USD or more. Though truncated at the upper end, these
data supply good calibration of physical capital stocks.
The WBES data provide no defensible empirical
measure of m
¯
ij = ij(Sj + Pj)—the minimum price of
corruption necessary to induce enforcement officials to
overlook unofficial production and tax evasion among
firms in various countries—or for other combinations of
32Thepercentagefrequencydistributionfort
¯
inthesampleof3,686
firms is
1=‘major’ 2=‘moderate’ 3=‘minor’ 4=‘no(ne)’
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TABLE1 DescriptiveStatistics
Variable AnalysisLevel Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Tax Toleration, t
¯
ij Firms (3686) overall 1.7 0.98 1 4
(1=Major Obstacle Countries (55) between 0.47
to 4=No Obstacle) within 0.87
Institutional Services, Bij Firms (3686) overall 2.6 0.73 1 4
(1=Major Obstacle to Countries (55) between 0.37
4=No Obstacle) within 0.65
Labor Regulations, RL
ij Firms (3686) overall 2.8 1.1 1 4
(1=Major Obstacle to Countries (55) between 0.57
4=No Obstacle) within 0.93
Regulations on Official Firms (3686) overall 3.0 0.72 1 4
Activity, RF
ij Countries (55) between 0.32
(1=Major Obstacle to within 0.65
4=No Obstacle)
Capital Assets, ¯ Kij Firms (3686) overall 108,595 197,376 125 500,000
(1000s USD) Countries (55) between 117,204
within 165,938
Tax Compliance,
yo
yo+yu ij Firms (3686) overall 79 27 25 100
midpoint values for 7 Countries (55) between 16
categories of % Sales within 23
Reported (25% to 100%)
%C o r p o r a t eT a xR a t e ,tF
j Countries (55) overall 30 6.3 15 45
%P a y r o l lT a xR a t e ,tL
j Countries (55) overall 28 13 4.2 53
Notes: Index i denotes firms and j denotes countries. Statistics for % Sales Reported are computed from midpoint values but ordinal
categories 1 to 7 are used as the dependent variable in the ordered logit regressions in Table 2. Mean/variance statistics for the ordinal
response variables should be interpreted with caution even though Wald and likelihood ratio tests support treating log values as interval
independent variables in the ordered logit regressions in Table 2.
ij, Sj, and Pj that affect equilibrium corruption prices
andproductiondecisions.As noted earlier,somecorrup-
tion price effects will be picked up by ¯ Kij because the
visibility and exposure of corrupt transactions are likely
to increase with firm size.
Measurement of remaining variables in (15) is more
straightforward. The corporate tax rate tF
j is measured
by the top marginal tax rate on corporate profits in each
country for year 2000,33 and the payroll tax rate tL
j is
measured by social security contribution rates for year
1999.34 Descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 show
that among variables varying by i and j, within-country
33Data are from the World Tax Database maintained by the Ross
SchoolofBusinessattheUniversityofMichiganandareavailableat
http://www.bus.umich.edu/otpr/otpr/introduction.htm.Measure-
mentofeffectiveratherthantopratesmighthavebeenbettersuited
to the analysis, but relevant data are not available.
34Contributions pertaining to old age, disability and death, sick-
nessandmaternity,workinjury,andunemploymentweresummed.
The data mix contributions from employers and employees in the
various payroll systems. The constituent data are from Social Secu-
standard deviations are 1.4 to 2.0 times the magnitude
of between-country standard deviations, implying that
firm-specific characteristics affecting those variables are
generally much more dispersed than country-specific
attributes.
Tax Compliance and the Official Share
of Production
The WBES data also allow empirical tests of the model’s
implications concerning determinants of tax compliance
asregisteredbytheshareofoutputdeclaredofficiallyand
subjecttotax.Figures2–4—andtheassociatedtheoretical
analyses—implied that the share of taxed, official output
in total output (
yo
yo+yu)ij is negatively related to the gap
between tax rates tij and levels of tax toleration t
¯
ij,w h e r e
t
¯
ij is in turn a function of the outside variables on the
rity Programs Throughout the World, available from the U.S. Social
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r i g h ts i d eo f( 1 5 ) .T h em e a s u r e m e n tm e t r i c so ftij and
t
¯
ij are incompatible, so direct computation of tax gaps is
infeasible. The model nonetheless implies the following
pattern of empirical relations:35

+
Bij, tw

−
tL
j ,
+
RL
ij

,
+/−
K ij

⇒
+
t
¯
ij ⇒ 
yo
yo + yu

ij
t

−
tF
j ,
+
RF
ij

⇒
(16)
Tax compliance as revealed by the official share of
total output (
yo
yo+yu)ij is measured by responses to the
WBES question “Recognizing the difficulties many enter-
prises face in fully complying with taxes and regulations,
what percentage of total sales would you estimate the typi-
cal firm in your area of activity reports for tax purposes?”36
The response options common to all countries in the
analysis fall into seven categories with irregular intervals
rangingfrom“< 50% ”s a l e sr e p o rt e du pt o“ 100%”s a l e s
reported.37 Descriptive statistics in Table 1, computed
from midpoint values of the seven “% sales reported”
categories, show that the standard deviation around the
mean value of 78% is more than 1.4 times higher within
countries than between them—a pattern similar to the
dispersions of other variables varying across firms and
countries. Since all firms sampled were legally registered,
it appears that simultaneous activity in the official and
unofficial economy is a quite common state of affairs, a
result consistent with a central feature of the theoretical
model developed in previous sections.
Regression Analyses
Table 2 reports three ordered logit regressions implied by
the testable implications of the theoretical model. With
one exception (Institutional Services in the first regres-
sion), independent variables are specified in logarithms.
35The expected signs of the analogous-to-tax, regulation variables
RL
ij and RF
ij are opposite to those of the conventional tax variables
tL
j and tF
j because responses are coded 1 = Major Obstacle to
4=NoObstacle,implyingthatregulatorycostsdeclinewithhigher
code values.
36The WBES naturally did not ask managers directly to acknowl-
edgecriminalbehaviorandforthisreasonthetaxevasionquestion
was phrased with reference to “the typical firm in your area of activ-
ity.” Such questions are commonly interpreted as revealing firms’
own behavior; see, for example, Johnson et al. (2000), Batra, Kauf-
mann, and Stone (2003), and Svensson (2003). Nonetheless, the
underlyingbehaviorofinterestisnecessarilymeasuredimprecisely.
37The percentage frequency distribution for the seven response
categories in the sample of 3,686 firms is
1 =< 50% 2 = 50 − 59% 3 = 60 − 69% 4 = 70 − 79% 5 = 80 − 89% 6 = 90 − 99% 7 = 100%
16% 7% 5% 8% 11% 12% 41%
Coefficient estimates therefore represent effects of pro-
portional movements in each independent variable on
the probabilities of various categorical responses implied
by the ordered logit estimator. Those specifications im-
plicitlyassumethattheordinalindependentvariablescan
betreatedasinterval—anassumptionsupportedbystan-
dard Wald and likelihood ratio tests showing that in-
clusion of a separate dummy indicator variable for each
linearly independent ordinal category adds no explana-
tory power to what is delivered by the single (“interval”)
log-variable specifications.38
Model (1) pertains to the determinants of Tax Tol-
eration t
¯
ij summarized by equation (15) and the top-left
part of (16). All determinants of t
¯
ij in the regression are
highly significant statistically and have signs consistent
with the underlying theoretical model,39 apart from log
Payroll Tax Rate which is correctly signed but has a p-
value of only 0.2. More important, the substantive effects
implied by the ordered logit regression coefficients are
large. Institutional Services B exerts the biggest influence
onTaxToleration.B isalsotheonlyindependentvariable
in Table 2 requiring ordinal representation by dummy
indicator variables for response categories. Recall that B
scalevaluesrangeover10orderedcategoriesspanning1to
4byincrementsofone-third.Coefficientsoftheindicator
dummiesincreasemonotonicallywiththescalevaluesbut
to conserve space only estimates for the lowest B = 1.33
andhighest B = 4.0scalecategoriesarereportedinTable
2. (B = 1 is the omitted category. It includes 2% of the
3,686casesanditseffectisabsorbedbythelogitcut-point
constants.)
To gauge magnitudes, consider a maximal improve-
ment to the Institutional Services index from B = 1
38“Linearly independent” means that in the presence of an “in-
terval” variable (whether it be in log or nonlog form only affects
parameter scales) and the cut-point constants of the ordered logit
estimator one includes in test regressions N-2 category dummies,
where N is the total number of a variable’s ordinal categories. Test-
ing setups are described by Long and Freese (2006, chap. 9.1).
Regressions based in the form of those reported in Table 2 with
independent variables expressed in nonlog metrics yield the same
pattern of results, but log-variable specifications yield somewhat
betterchisquaresignificancestatisticsforthemodelsentertained.A
parallel set of regressions including (additive) fixed sectoral effects
was also undertaken to take account of the possibility of corre-
lated errors across firms within a sector (agriculture, manufac-
turing, construction, services, and “other”). Point estimates and
significance levels from those regressions were nearly identical to
those reported in Table 2. The various test results comprise many
big tables and can be generated by running Stata files posted at
www.douglas-hibbs.com.
39Recall, however, that the model did not make an unambiguous
prediction for the sign of a firm’s capital stock, ¯ Kij. The significant
positivecoefficientimpliesthattheindirecteffectsof ¯ Kij dominate
the direct effects, but this cannot be taken as evidence one way or
the other of the model’s validity.30 DOUGLAS A. HIBBS AND VIOLETA PICULESCU
TABLE2 Regressions
Dependent Variables: Tax Toleration Tax Compliance
t
¯
i j (1 =Major Obstacle to
yo
yo+yu i j (1 =< 50%, 2 = 50–59%,
4 = No Obstacle) 3 =60–69% ...7 =100%)
Model: (1)( 2)( 3)
structural form reduced form structural form
Institutional Services, ln(Bij + 1) 1.45
(0.263|0.000)
category 2, Bij = 1.33 0.879
(0.388|0.0229)
category 10, Bij = 4.02 . 8 8
(0.482|0.000)
Payroll Tax Rate, −0.259 0.0113
ln(tL
j + 1) (0.201|0.197) (0.206|0.956)
Labor Regulations, 1.20 −0.225
ln(R
L
ij + 1) (0.308|0.000) (0.132|0.0888)
Corporate Tax Rate, −0.822 −0.574
ln(tF
j + 1) (0.204|0.000) (0.150|0.000)
Regulations on Official −0.0675 0.549
Activity, ln(RF
ij + 1) (0.279|0.809) (0.262|0.0358)
Capital Assets, 0.111 0.0861
ln ¯ Kij (0.028|0.000) (0.0191|0.000)
Tax Toleration, 0.733
ln(t
¯
ij + 1) (0.203|.000)
Wald tests support interval yes yes yes
assumptions for ordinal variables
Wald 2 |p-value to reject NA 8.13|0.229 2.14|0.544
restriction F  (·) = 0a tt
¯
= 4
Overall Model Wald 2 |p-value 159|0.000 61.8|0.000 19.2|0.000
NF i r m s|N Countries 3686|55 3686|55 3686|55
Notes: Estimation method is ordered logit with robust standard errors (clustered by country). In parentheses (standard error|p-value).
Index i denotes firms and j denotes countries. In Models (2) and (3) independent variables are interacted with a “lower tax tolerance”
dummyvariable LT,whe r eLT = 0ift
¯
= 4(taxespose“noobstacle”),else LT = 1.Recallthat RL
ij and RF
ij arescored1=MajorObstacle
to 4 = No Obstacle and are therefore expected to have signs opposite to those of the associated conventional tax rate variables tL
j and tF
j .
to B = 4holdingothervariablesconstantattheirmeans.
ComputationsusingestimatesforModel(1)indicatethis
enhancement to B would lower the probabilities a rep-
resentative firm would perceive taxes as a major obstacle
(t
¯
= 1) by 0.55 or as a moderate obstacle (t
¯
= 2) by 0.06,
while raising the probabilities of taxes being viewed as a
minor obstacle or no obstacle at all (t
¯
= 3,4) by 0.14 and
0.46, respectively. Those are big tax toleration effects.
The impact of shifts in log Labor Regulations is less
dramatic, yet also sizeable. A maximal shift (from the
perception that labor regulations are a major obstacle to
no obstacle) decreases the probability that taxes would be
regarded as a major obstacle by 0.25, and increases the
probabilities of responses in the moderate, minor,a n dno
obstacle categories by 0.11, 0.08, and 0.06, respectively.
The impact of increases to a firm’s log Capital Assets are
on balance positive but much weaker than other inde-
pendent variables, perhaps because the direct and indi-
rect effects already described tend to offset one another.
Computations show that in order for an increase in ln ¯ K
to have as much effect on Tax Toleration as the shift in
ln RL discussedabove,atypicalfirmwouldhavetoexpe-
rience a sea change in its capital endowment—from next
to nothing all the way up to the measured maximum of a
half-billion U.S. dollars.
Regression Models (2) and (3) investigate the deter-
minants of Tax Compliance
yo
yo+yu as measured by the
W B E Si n t e rv i e wd a t ao n%S a l e sR e p o rt e dt ot a xa u t h o r -
ities.Model(2)isthereducedformofthecausalrelations
sketched in equation (16). Model (3) is the structuralTAX TOLERATION AND TAX COMPLIANCE 31
form. In both models independent variables are inter-
acted with a binary variable LT identifying firms whose
managerstosomedegreeperceivetaxesasproblematicfor
business operations: LT = 1w h e nt
¯
= 1,2, or 3 (taxes
pose“major,” “moderate,” or“minor” obstacles); LT = 0
when t
¯
= 4( t a x e sp o s e“no obstacle”). The latter firms,
which comprise 9% of the sample, are the ones depicted
in Figure 2 as located to the left of t
¯
.T h et h e o r e t i c a l
model implies that among those firms Tax Compliance
is not affected by the relative magnitudes of log Corpo-
rate Tax Rates and log Tax Toleration in structural form
( M o d e l3 ) ,o rb yt h er e l a t i v em a g n i t u d e so fl ntF and the
determinants of lnt
¯
i nr e d u c e df o r m( M o d e l2 ) . 40 Test
statistics reported in the bottom part of Table 2 demon-
stratethattherestrictionsto theorderedlogitregressions
imposed by the LT interactions—namely F  (·) = 0a t
t
¯
= 4—cannot be rejected with any confidence.
Estimation of the reduced-form ordered logit model
for Tax Compliance yields highly significant and sub-
stantively big effects for log Institutional Services and log
Corporate Tax Rates, small and significant effects for log
Capital Assets,41 and insignificant effects for the Regu-
lations and Payroll Tax Rate variables ln RL, ln RF, and
lntL. As was true for Tax Toleration, perceived useful-
nessofInstitutionalServicesexertsgreatinfluenceonTax
Compliance. For example, a maximal improvement to
ln B, with other variables held at mean values, decreases
theprobabilityatypicalfirm’sTaxCompliancewouldfall
in the bottom category (0–50% Sales Reported) by 0.40,
whilst increasing the probability of full Tax Compliance
(100% Sales Reported) by 0.46. A maximal increase in
lntF (from log 15% to log 45.5%) also has big effects.
Computations show that an escalation of Corporate Tax
Rates of this magnitude lowers the probability of full Tax
Compliance by around 0.62 and raises the probability of
all other categories, with much of the shift (0.23 proba-
bility points) heaped at the bottom 0–50% range of Tax
Compliance.
The theoretical structure summarized in equation
(16) asserts that a firm’s threshold of tax toleration en-
capsulatestheeffectsoftheinstitutionalenvironmentand
otherreduced-formindependentvariablesonafirm’sin-
centive to remain in the official taxed economy, as op-
posed to operating underground. Model (3) estimates
that structure directly with an ordered logit regression of
40Tax Compliance among the 9% of firms with LT = 0( t
¯
= 4) is
given statistically by the cut-point constants of the ordered logistic
models.
41As before, the results for ln ¯ K say little about the applicability of
the model to the data because the direct negative and indirect pos-
itive effects of capital endowments on a firm’s incentive to produce
officially may tend to offset one another.
Tax Compliance on lnt
¯
, lntF, and ln RF alone. The re-
sults strongly support the prediction that increases to log
Tax Toleration positively affect Tax Compliance, thereby
offsetting at least to some degree the negative effects on
ComplianceexertedbyCorporateTaxesandRegulations.
Takentogether,theempiricalresultsarebroadlysupport-
ive of the underlying theory about how quality of gover-
nance affects the propensity of profit-maximizing firms
to remain in the official taxed economy, as opposed to
evading taxes and producing underground. Indeed, the
correspondence of theory and evidence appears partic-
ularly strong in view of the noisy, interview-based mea-
surements of the model’s key variables.
ConcludingObservations
The central implication of theoretical and empirical re-
sults in this article is that markets for corruption arise
and big migrations out of legal production into the un-
derground economy occur when large numbers of firms
perceivetaxesasnot“worthpaying”—anunfortunatecir-
cumstance that was summarized in terms of profit taxes
imposed on producers in the official economy relative to
firms’thresholdsoftaxtoleration.Taxtolerationisdriven
by firm-specific appraisals of the availability, quality, and
usefulness of government services supporting official ac-
tivities, by taxes and regulations on officially employed
labor, by the compensation of enforcement authorities,
and by the effectiveness of detection and punishment of
bureaucratic malfeasance. Because most of those deter-
minants differ across firms, tax toleration and tax com-
pliance vary among producers facing the same rates of
conventional profit taxation and operating in the same
national political-institutional environment.
Firms without much intrinsic need of government
institutionalserviceswilllikelyalwaysbetemptedtopro-
duce unofficially and evade taxation unless tax rates are
negligible or corruption prices are extremely high. The
latter would tend to be the case when enforcement au-
thorities are handsomely compensated, when they stand
highchancesofbeingcaughtsellingcorruption,andwhen
theyarestringentlypenalizedforanymalfeasancediscov-
ered. Though government policy clearly can affect such
supply-of-corruption variables, it can do little to influ-
e n c et h ea p p e t i t ef o rt a xe v a s i o na m o n gf i r m st h a ti n -
herently have little or no interest in official institutional
services, no matter how well tuned and accessible those
services might be. Yet such firms are likely to be small
(and in many cases single-person operations, like the
home-cleaninghelpengagedunofficiallybymanyreaders
of this article) and at the margins of many economies.32 DOUGLAS A. HIBBS AND VIOLETA PICULESCU
Mostbigplayersinaneconomypotentiallytakegreat
productive benefit of formal institutional services, and
theirpropensitytoremainintheofficial,tax-payingecon-
omy can therefore be influenced by government efforts
to build and sustain institutions of quality. Firms with
substantial intrinsic need of services will tend to develop
hightaxtoleration,ifappropriateinstitutionsareinplace.
Government fiscal policy is then less constrained—with
high tax toleration, relatively high taxes on official pro-
ductive activity may be imposed without great fear of
inducing a mass exodus of tax-paying producers into the
black economy.
Heterogeneity of tax toleration among firms has im-
plications for the aggregate effects of policies targeted on
the scale of the shadow economy and tax evasion. De-
pending on how many and to what extent firms within
a country have incentive to produce underground and
evade taxation, policies regarding profit taxation and
the employment conditions of enforcement bureaucrats
may create trade-offs between containment of tax eva-
sion and the overall level of economic activity. For in-
stance, strengthening incentives of enforcement officials
to remain honest reduces bureaucratic corruption and
unofficialeconomicactivityatthecostofdepressingtotal
output among evading firms, without affecting the pro-
ductive activity of nonevading firms. If the economy is
dominatedbyfirmswithlowthresholdsoftaxtoleration,
then higher bureaucratic salaries and better corruption
detectionmechanismsmayyieldonlymodestexpansions
of official production and contractions of total output.
Casual observation of the situation in many develop-
ing countries, and some developed ones too, suggests
that stamping out unofficial economic activity would on
the whole depress aggregate income and economic well-
being.
Thelikelyeffectsofpoliciesaddressingtaxevasionby
loweringprofittaxratesaremoreambiguous.Indevelop-
ingcountries,wheremanyfirmsarelikelytobesmalland
heavily involved in unofficial activity, reduction of profit
tax rates will help reduce underground production, raise
taxcompliance,andincreasenationaloutput.Profittaxa-
tionpolicy,however,exertslessimpactincountrieswhere
many firms operate on the border of their tax tolerance,
in the sense that their tax toleration threshold is lower
than but close to the statutory tax rate. In such cases the
first-order effects of reductions to profit tax rates would
tend to shrink aggregate income.
Yet the model implies that a trade-off of a smaller
underground economy at the cost of lower aggregate
output does not arise with policies that affect institu-
tional services and taxes and regulations on officially
employed labor. Such policies influence all firms in
the economy because they affect the productivity and
profitability of factors deployed in official production.
Government-supported institutions directly benefiting
production,forexample,havetheadvantageofgivingtax-
evading firms incentive to reduce their unofficial opera-
tions, while also inducing higher levels of output among
all firms in the economy, regardless of their location on
the continuum of tax compliance. This theoretical impli-
cation may help explain the strong positive correlation
between indicators of institutional quality and estimated
levels of total and official aggregate national output re-
ported in many macrolevel empirical studies.
Our firm-level analysis rightly treated institutional
benefits and taxes as unconnected outside variables be-
causeanyparticularfirmwouldcorrectlyperceiveachoice
to evade taxes and regulations by producing unofficially
ashavingnegligibleimpactonthegovernment’sresources
and its capacity to deliver services from which the firm
might profit. However, in the macro political economy
those variables are intimately connected, if only because
public institutions of high quality require commensu-
rately large investments of public revenue raised by taxa-
tion.42 In principle a virtuous circle is possible in which
high taxes and high tax compliance coexist amicably be-
cause important producers are anchored firmly in the
official economy, supplying the tax revenues required to
build and sustain well-functioning institutions that un-
derpinhightolerationoftaxation.
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